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Abstract: In the first of this pair of papers, it was proven that there cannot be a physical computer
to which one can properly pose any and all computational tasks concerning the physical universe.
It was then further proven that no physical computer C can correctly carry out all computational
tasks that can be posed to C. As a particular example, this result means that no physical computer
that can, for any physical system external to that computer, take the specification of that external
system’s state as input and then correctly predict its future state before that future state actually
occurs; one cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly “processing infor-
mation faster than the universe does”. These results do not rely on systems that are infinite, and/or
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an infinitely fast,
infinitely dense computer, with computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine. This
generality is a direct consequence of the fact that a novel definition of computation — “physical
computation” — is needed to address the issues considered in these papers, which concern real
2physical computers. While this novel definition does not fit into the traditional Chomsky hierar-
chy, the mathematical structure and impossibility results associated with it have parallels in the
mathematics of the Chomsky hierarchy. This second paper of the pair presents a preliminary
exploration of some of this mathematical structure. Analogues of Chomskian results concerning
universal Turing Machines and the Halting theorem are derived, as are results concerning the
(im)possibility of certain kinds of error-correcting codes. In addition, an analogue of algorithmic
information complexity, “prediction complexity”, is elaborated. A task-independent bound is
derived on how much the prediction complexity of a computational task can differ for two differ-
ent reference universal physical computers used to solve that task, a bound similar to the “encod-
ing” bound governing how much the algorithm information complexity of a Turing machine
calculation can differ for two reference universal Turing machines. Finally, it is proven that either
the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complex-
ity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity), in that there is one and only version of
it that can be applicable throughout our universe.
3INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been heightened interest in the relationship between physics and computa-
tion ([1-33]). This interest extends far beyond the topic of quantum computation. On the one
hand, physics has been used to investigate the limits on computation imposed by operating com-
puters in the real physical universe. Conversely, there has been speculation concerning the limits
imposed on the physical universe (or at least imposed on our models of the physical universe) by
the need for the universe to process information, as computers do.
To investigate this second issue one would like to know what fundamental distinctions, if any,
there are between the physical universe and a physical computer. To address this issue the first of
this pair of papers begins by establishing that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one
can pose any arbitrary computational task. Accordingly, paper I goes on to consider computer-
indexed subsets of computational tasks, where all the members of any such subset can be posed to
the associated computer. It then proves that one cannot build a computer that can “process infor-
mation faster than the universe”. More precisely, it is shown that one cannot build a computer that
can, for any physical system, correctly predict any aspect of that system’s future state before that
future state actually occurs. This is true even if the prediction problem is restricted to be from the
set of computational tasks that can be posed to the computer.
This asymmetry in computational speeds constitutes a fundamental distinction between the
universe and the set of all physical computers. Its existence casts an interesting light on the ideas
of Fredkin, Landauer and others concerning whether the universe “is” a computer, whether there
are “information-processing restrictions” on the laws of physics, etc. [10, 18]. In a certain sense,
the universe is more powerful than any information-processing system constructed within it could
be. This result can alternatively be viewed as a restriction on the universe as a whole — the uni-
verse cannot support the existence within it of a computer that can process information as fast as it
can.
The analysis of paper I also establishes (for example) the necessarily fallible nature of retrod-
4iction, of control, and of observation. (This latter result can be viewed as a kind of uncertainty
principle that does not rely on quantum mechanics.) The way that results of such generality are
derived is by examining the underlying issues from the broad perspective of the computational
character of physical systems in general, rather than that of some single precisely specified physi-
cal system. The associated mathematics does not directly involve dynamical systems like Turing
machines. Rather it casts computation in terms of partitions of the space of possible worldlines of
the universe. For example, to specify what input a particular physical computer has at a particular
time is to specify a particular subset of all possible worldlines of the universe; different inputs to
the computation correspond to different such subsets. Similar partitions specify outputs of a phys-
ical computer. Results concerning the (im)possibility of certain kinds of physical computation are
derived by considering the relationship between these kinds of partitions. In its being defined in
terms of such partitions, “physical computation” involves a structure that need not even be instan-
tiated in some particular physically localized apparatus; the formal definition of a physical com-
puter is general enough to also include more subtle non-localized dynamical processes unfolding
across the entire universe.
This second paper begins with a cursory review of these partition-based definitions and
results of paper I. Despite its being distinct from the mathematics of the Chomsky hierarchy, as
elaborated below, the mathematics and impossibility results governing these partitions bears many
parallels with that of the Chomsky hierarchy. Section 2 of this second paper explicates some of
that mathematical structure, involving topics ranging from error correction to the (lack of) transi-
tivity of computational predictability across multiple distinct computers. In particular, results are
presented concerning physical computation analogues of the mathematics of Turing machines,
e.g., “universal” physical computers, and Halting theorems for physical computers. In addition, an
analogue of algorithmic information complexity, “prediction complexity”, is elaborated. A task-
independent bound is derived on how much the prediction complexity of a computational task can
differ for two different reference universal physical computers used to solve that task. This bound
is similar to the “encoding” bound governing how much the algorithmic information complexity
5of a Turing machine calculation can differ for two reference universal Turing machines. It is then
proven that one of two cases must hold. One is that the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a
certain type of computation. The other possibility is that, unlike conventional algorithmic infor-
mation complexity, its physical computation analogue is unique, in that there is one and only ver-
sion of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.
Throughout these papers, B ≡ {0, 1}, ℜ is defined to be the set of all real numbers, ‘^’ is the
logical and operator, and ‘NOT’ is the logical not operator applied to B. To avoid proliferation of
symbols, often set-delineating curly brackets will be used surrounding a single symbol, in which
case that symbol is to taken to be a variable with the indicated set being the set of all values of that
variable. So for example “{y}” refers to the set of all values of the variable y. In addition o(A) is
the cardinality of any set A, and 2A is the power set of A. u ∈ U are the possible states of the uni-
verse, and ^U is the space of allowed trajectories through U. So ^u ∈ ^U is a single-valued map from
t ∈ ℜ to u ∈ U, with ut ≡ ^ut the state of the universe at time t. Note that since the universe is
microscopically deterministic, ut for any t uniquely specifies
^
u. Sometimes there will be implicit
constraints on ^U. For example, we will assume in discussing any particular computer that the
space ^U is restricted to worldlines ^u that contain that computer. An earlier analysis addressing
some of the issues considered in this pair of papers can be found in [30].
I. REVIEW OF DEFINITIONS AND FOUNDATIONAL RESULTS RELATED TO
PHYSICAL COMPUTATION
In paper I the process by which real physical computers make predictions concerning physical
systems is abstracted to produce a mathematical definition of physical computation. This section
reviews that definition and the associated fundamental mathematical results. The reader is
referred to paper I for more extensive discussion of the definitions.
6i) Definition of a Physical Computer
We start by distinguishing the specification of what we want the computer to calculate from
the results of that calculation:
Definition 1: Any question q ∈ Q is a pair, consisting of a set A of answers and a single-valued
function from ^u ∈ ^U to α ∈ A. A(q) indicates the A-component of the pair q.
Here we restrict attention to Q that are non-empty and such that there exist at least two elements
in A(q) for at least one q ∈ Q. We make no other a priori assumptions concerning the spaces
{A(q ∈ Q)} and Q. In particular, we make no assumptions concerning their finiteness.
Example 1 (conventional prediction of the future): Say that our universe contains a system S
external to our computer that is closed in the time interval [0, T], and let u be the values of the ele-
ments of a set of canonical variables describing the universe. α is the t = T values of the compo-
nents of u that concern S, measured on some finite grid G of finite precision. q is this definition of
α with G and the like fully specified. (So q is a partition of the space of possible uT, and therefore
of ^U, and α is an element of that partition.) Q is a set of such q’s, differing in G, whose associated
answers our computer can (we hope) predict correctly.
The input to the computer is implicitly reflected in its t = 0 physical state, as our interpretation
of that state. In this example (though not necessarily in general), that input specifies what question
we want answered, i.e., which q and associated T we are interested in. It also delineates one of
several regions R ⊆ ^U, each of which, intuitively, gives the t = 0 state of S. Throughout each such
R, the system S is closed from the rest of the universe during t ∈ [0, T]. The precise R delineated
further specifies a set of possible values of u0 (and therefore of the Hamiltonian describing S), for
example by being an element of a (perhaps irregular) finite precision grid over U0, G'. If, for some
R, q( ^u ) has the same value for all ^u ∈ R, then this input R uniquely specifies what α is for any
associated ^u. If this is not the case, then the R input to the computer does not suffice to answer
7question q. So for any q and region R both of which can be specified in the computer’s input, R
must be a subset of a region q-1(α) for some α.
Implicit in this definition is some means for correctly getting the information R into the com-
puter’s input. In practice, this is often done by having had the computer coupled to S sometime
before time 0. As an alternative, rather than specify R in the input, we could have the input contain
a “pointer” telling the computer where to look to get the information R. (The analysis of these
papers holds no matter how the computer gains access to R.) In addition, in practice the input, giv-
ing R, q, and T, is an element of a partition over an “input section” of our computer. In such a
case, the input is itself an element of a finite precision grid over ^U, G". So an element of G" spec-
ifies an element of G (namely q) and element of G' (namely R.)
Given its input, the computer (tries to) form its prediction for α by first running the laws of
physics on a u0 having the specified value as measured on G', according to the specified Hamilto-
nian, up to the specified time T. The computer then applies q(.) to the result. Finally, it writes this
prediction for α onto its output and halts. (More precisely, using some fourth finite precision grid
G"' over its output section, it “writes out” (what we interpret as) its prediction for what region in
U the universe will be in at T, that prediction being formally equivalent to a prediction of a region
in ^U.) The goal is to have it do this, with the correct value of α, by time τ < T. Note that to have
the computer’s output be meaningful, it must specify the question q being answered as well as the
answer α, i.e., the output must be a physical state of the computer that we interpret as a question-
answer pair.
Consider again the case where there is in fact a correct prediction, i.e., where R is indeed a
subset of the region q-1(α) for some α. For this case, formally speaking, “all the computer has to
do” in making its prediction is recognize which such region in the partition q that is input to the
computer contains the region R that is also input to the computer. Then it must output the label of
that region in q. In practice though, q and R are usually “encoded” differently, and the computer
must “translate” between those encodings to recognize which region q-1(α) contains R; this trans-
lation constitutes the “computation”.
8Given this definition of a question, we can now define the input and output portions of a phys-
ical computer by generalizing our example of conventional computation.
Definition 2: i) A (computation) partition is a set of disjoint subsets of ^u whose union equals ^U,
or equivalently a single-valued mapping from ^U into a non-empty space of partition-element
labels. Unless stated otherwise, any partition is assumed to contain at least two elements.
ii) In an output partition, the space of partition element labels is a space of possible “outputs”,
{OUT}.
iii) In a physical computer, we require {OUT} to be the space of all pairs {OUTq ∈ Q, OUTα ∈
A(OUTq)}, for some Q and A(.) as defined in Def. (1). This space — and therefore the associated
output partition — is implicitly a function of Q. To make this explicit, often, rather than an output
partition, we will consider the full associated double (Q, OUT(.)), where OUT(.) is the output par-
tition ^u ∈ ^U → OUT ∈ {OUTq ∈ Q, OUTα ∈ A(OUTq)}. Also, we will find it useful to use an
output partition to define an associated (“prediction”) partition, OUTp(.) : ^u → (A(OUTq( ^u ),
OUTα( ^u )).
iv) In an input partition, the space of partition element labels is a space of possible “inputs”,
{IN}.
v) A (physical) computer consists of an input partition and an output partition double. Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, both of those partitions are required to be (separately) surjective.
Since we are restricting attention to non-empty Q, {OUT} is non-empty. We say that OUTq is the
“question posed to the computer”, and OUTα is “the computer’s answer”. The surjectivity of IN(.)
and OUT(.) is a restriction on {IN} and {OUT}, respectively.
While motivated in large measure by the task of predicting the future, the definition of physi-
cal computation is far broader, concerning any computation that can be cast in terms of inputs,
questions about physical states of nature, and associated answers. This set of questions includes in
9particular any calculation that can be instantiated in a physical system in our universe, whether
that question is a “prediction” or not. All such physically realizable calculations are subject to the
results presented below.
Even in the context of prediction though, the definition of a physical computer presented here
is much broader than computers that work by the process outlined in Ex. 1 (and therefore the
associated theorems are correspondingly further-ranging in their implications). For example, the
computer in Ex. 1 has the laws of physics explicitly built into its “program”. But our definition
allows other kinds of “programs” as well. Our definition also allows other kinds of information
input to the computer besides q and a region R (which together with T constitute the inputs in Ex.
1). As discussed in paper I, we will only need to require that there be some t = 0 state of the com-
puter that, by accident or by design, induces the correct prediction at t = τ. This means we do not
even require that the computer’s initial state IN “accurately describes” the t = 0 external universe
in any meaningful sense. Our generalization of Ex. 1 preserves analogues of the grids G (in Q(.)),
G" (in IN(.)) and G"' (in OUT(.)), but not of the grid G'.
In fact, our formal definition of a physical computer broadens what we mean by the “input to
the computer”, IN, even further. While the motivation for our definition, exemplified in Ex. 1, has
the partition IN(.) “fix the initial state of the computer’s inputs section”, that need not be the case.
IN(.) can reflect any attributes of ^u. An “input” — an element of a partition of ^U — need not
even involve the t = 0 state of the physical computer. In other words, as we use the terms here, the
computer’s “input” need not be specified in some t = 0 state of a physical device. Indeed, our def-
inition does not even explicitly delineate the particular physical system within the universe that
we identify with the computer. (A physical computer is simply an input partition together with an
output partition.) This means we can even choose to have the entire universe “be the computer”.
For our purposes, we do not need tighter restrictions in our definition of a physical computer.
Nonetheless, a pedagogically useful example is any localized physical device in the real world




Consider a “conventional” physical computer, consisting of an underlying physical system
whose t = 0 state sets IN( ^u ) and whose state at time τ sets OUT( ^u ), as in our example above.
We wish to analyze whether the physical system underlying that computer can calculate the future
sufficiently quickly. In doing so, we do not want to allow any of the “computational load” of the
calculation to be “hidden” in a restriction on the possible questions. Our computer possess a suffi-
cient degree of flexibility. We impose this via the following construction (see paper I for a detailed
justification):
Definition 3: Consider a physical computer C ≡ (Q, IN(.), OUT(.)) and a ^U-partition pi. A func-
tion from ^U into B, f, is an intelligibility function (for pi) if
∀ ^u, ^u' ∈ ^U, pi( ^u ) = pi( ^u' ) ⇒ f( ^u ) = f( ^u' ).
A set F of such intelligibility functions is an intelligibility set for pi.
We view any intelligibility function as a question by defining A(f) to be the image of ^U under
f. If F is an intelligibility set for pi and F ⊆ Q, we say that pi is intelligible to C with respect to F. If
the intelligibility set is not specified, it is implicitly understood to be the set of all intelligibility
functions for pi.
We say that two physical computers C1 and C2 are mutually intelligible (with respect to the
pair {Fi}) iff both OUT2 is intelligible to C1 with respect to F2 and OUT1 is intelligible to C2 with
respect to F1.
Plugging in, pi is intelligible to C iff ∀ intelligibility functions f, ∃ q ∈ OUTq such that q = f, i.e.,
such that A(q) = the image of ^U under f, and such that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U, q( ^u ) = f( ^u ). Note that since pi
contains at least two elements, if pi is intelligible to C, ∃ OUTq ∈ {OUTq} such that A(OUTq) =
B, an OUTq such that A(OUTq) = {0}, and one such that A(OUTq) = {1}. Usually we are inter-
ested in the case where pi is an output partition of a physical computer, as in mutual intelligibility.
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Intuitively, an intelligibility function for a partition pi is a mapping from the elements of pi into
B. pi is intelligible to C if Q contains all binary-valued functions of pi, i.e., if C can have posed any
question concerning the universe as measured on pi. This flexibility in C ensures that C’s output
partition isn’t “rigged ahead of time” in favor of some particular question concerning pi. Formally,
by the surjectivity of OUT(.), the requirement of intelligibility means that ∃ ^u' ∈ ^U such that ∀ ^u
∈
^U, [OUTq( ^u' )]( ^u ) = f( ^u ).
iii) Predictable computation
We can now formalize the concept of a physical computer’s “making a correct prediction”:
Definition 4: Consider a physical computer C, partition pi, and intelligibility set for pi, F. We say
that pi is weakly predictable to C with respect to F iff:
i) pi is intelligible to C with respect to F, i.e., F ⊆ OUTq ;
ii) ∀ f ∈ F, ∃ IN ∈ {IN} that weakly induces f, i.e., an IN such that:
IN( ^u )  =  IN
⇒
OUTp( ^u )  =  (A(OUTq( ^u )), OUTα( ^u ))  =  (A(f), f( ^u )).
Intuitively, condition (ii) means that for all questions q in F, there is an input state such that if C is
initialized to that input state, C’s answer to that question q (as evaluated at τ) must be correct.
Note that we even allow the computer to be mistaken about what question it is answering — i.e.,
for OUTq( ^u ) to not equal f — so long as C’s answer is correct. We will say a computer C' with
output OUT'(.) is weakly predictable to another if the partition OUT'p(.) is. If we just say “predict-
able” it will be assumed that we mean weak predictability.
As a formal matter, note that in the definition of predictable, even though f(.) is surjective onto
A(f) (cf. Def. 3), it may be that for some IN, the set of values f( ^u ) takes on when ^u is restricted
so that IN( ^u ) = IN do not cover all of A(f). The reader should also bear in mind that by surjectiv-
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ity, ∀ IN ∈ {IN}, ∃ ^u ∈ ^U such that IN( ^u ) = IN.
iv) Distinguishable computers
There is one final definition that we need before we can establish our unpredictability results:
Definition 5: Consider a set of n physical computers {Ci ≡ (Qi, INi(.), OUTi(.)) : i = 1, ..., n}. We
say {Ci} is (input) distinguishable iff ∀ n-tuples (IN1 ∈ {IN1}, ..., INn ∈ {INn}), ∃ ^u ∈ ^U such
that ∀ i, INi( ^u ) = INi simultaneously.
We say that {Ci} is pairwise (input) distinguishable if any pair of computers from {Ci} is distin-
guishable, and will sometimes say that any two such computers C1 and C2 “are distinguishable
from each other”. We will also say that {Ci} is a maximal (pairwise) distinguishable set if there
are no physical computers C ∉ {Ci} such that C ∪ {Ci} is a (pairwise) distinguishable set.
iv) The impossibility of posing arbitrary questions to a computer
The first result in paper I states that for any pair of physical computers there are always
binary-valued questions about the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of
those physical computers:
Theorem 1: Consider any pair of physical computers {Ci : i = 1, 2}. Either ∃ finite intelligibility
set F2 for C2 such that C2 is not intelligible to C1 with respect to F2, and/or ∃ finite intelligibility
set F1 for C1 such that C1 is not intelligible to C2 with respect to F1.
Thm. 1 reflects the fact that while we do not want to have C’s output partition “rigged ahead of
time” in favor of some single question, we also cannot require too much flexibility of our com-
puter. It is necessary to balance these two considerations. Accordingly, before analyzing predic-
tion of the future, to circumvent Thm. 1 we must define a restricted kind of intelligibility set to
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which Thm. 1 does not apply:
Definition 6: An intelligibility function f for an output partition OUT(.) is question-independent
iff ∀ ^u, ^u' ∈ ^U:
OUTp( ^u )  =  OUTp( ^u' )
⇒
     f( ^u ) = f( ^u' ).
An intelligibility set as a whole is question-independent if all its elements are.
We write C1 > C2 (or equivalently C2 < C1) and say simply that C2 is (weakly) predictable to
C1 (or equivalently that C1 can predict C2) if C2 is weakly predictable to C1 for all question-inde-
pendent finite intelligibility sets for C2.
Similarly, from now on we will say that C2 is intelligible to C1 without specification of an
intelligibility set if C2 is intelligible to C1 with respect to all question-independent finite intelligi-
bility sets for C2.
Intuitively, f is question-independent if its value does not vary with q among any set of q all of
which share the same A(q). As an example, say our physical computer is a conventional digital
workstation. Have a certain section of the workstation’s RAM be designated the “output section”
of that workstation. That output section is further divided into a “question subsection” designating
(i.e., “containing”) a q, and an “answer subsection” designating an α. Say that for all q that can be
designated by the question subsection A(q) is a single bit, i.e., we are only interested in binary-
valued questions. Then for a question-independent f, the value of f can only depend on whether
the answer subsection contains a 0 or a 1. It cannot vary with the contents of the question subsec-
tion.
A detailed example of a pair of mutually (question-independent) intelligible computers is pre-
sented in paper I. In addition to this explicit demonstration that Thm. 1 does not hold for question-
independent intelligibility sets, examples 2, 2', and 2" of paper I establish that:
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a) There are pairs of input-distinguishable physical computers, C1, C2, in which C2 is predictable
to C1, C1 > C2;
b) Given C1 and C2 as in (a), we could have yet another computer C3 that also predicts C2 (i.e.,
such that C3 > C2) while being distinguishable from C1;
c) Given C1 and C2 as in (a), we could have a computer C4, distinguishable from both C1 and C2,
where C4 > C1, so that C4 > C1 > C2. We can do this either with C4 > C2 or not.
ii) The impossibility of assuredly correct prediction
To establish our main impossibility result in paper I we started with the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Consider a physical computer C1. If ∃ any output partition OUT2 that is intelligible to
C1, then ∃ q1 ∈ Q1 such that A(q1) = B, a q1 ∈ Q1 such that A(q1) = {0}, and a q1 ∈ Q1 such that
A(q1) = {1}.
This can be used to establish paper I’s central theorem:
Theorem 2: Consider any pair of distinguishable physical computers {Ci : i = 1, 2}. It is not pos-
sible that both C1 > C2 and C1 < C2.
Restating it, Thm. 2 says that either ∃ finite question-independent intelligibility set for C1, F1,
such that C1 is not predictable to C2 with respect to F1, and/or ∃ finite question-independent intel-
ligibility set for C2, F2, such that C2 is not predictable to C1 with respect to F2.
Thm. 2 holds no matter how large and powerful our computers are; it even holds if the “phys-
ical system underlying” one or both of our computers is the whole universe. It also holds if instead
C2 is the rest of the physical universe external to C1. A set of implications of Thm. 2 for various
kinds of physical prediction scenarios are discussed in paper I. As also discussed there, impossi-
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bility results that are in some senses even stronger than those associated with Thm. 2 hold when
we do not restrict ourselves to distinguishable computers, as we do in Thm. 2.
3. THE MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE RELATING PHYSICAL COMPUTERS
There is a rich mathematical structure governing the possible predictability relationships
among sets of physical computers, especially if one relaxes the presumption (obtaining in much of
paper I) that the universe can contain multiple copies of C. This section presents some of that
structure.
i)  The graphical structure over a set of computers induced by weak predictability
While it directly concerns pairs of physical computers, Thm. 2 also has implications for the
predictability relationships within sets of more than two computers. An example is the following:
Corollary 1: It is not possible to have a fully distinguishable set of n physical computers {Ci}
such that C1 > C2 > ... > Cn > C1.
Proof: Hypothesize that the corollary is wrong. Define the composite device C* ≡ (ΙΝ∗(.) ≡
Πi=1
n-1 INi(.), Q1, OUT1(.)). Since {Ci} is fully distinguishable, IN*(.) is surjective. Therefore C*
is a physical computer.
Since by hypothesis Cn is intelligible to Cn-1, ∃ OUTn-1q such that A(OUTn-1q) = B. Also,
since Cn-2 > Cn-1, ∃ INn-2 ∈ {INn-2} such that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U for which A(OUTn-1q( ^u )) = B,
INn-2( ^u ) = INn-2 ⇒ OUTn-2α( ^u ) = OUTn-1α( ^u ). Iterating and exploiting full distinguishabil-
ity, ∃ (IN1, ..., INn-2) such that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U for which A(OUTn-1q( ^u )) = B, (IN1( ^u ), .., INn-2( ^u ))
= (IN1, ..., INn-2) ⇒ OUT*( ^u ) = OUT1( ^u ) = OUTn-1( ^u ). The same holds when we restrict ^u
so that the space A(OUTn-1q( ^u )) = {1}, and when we restrict ^u so that A(OUTn-1q( ^u )) = {0}.
Since by hypothesis Cn is intelligible to Cn-1, and since IN*(.) is surjective, this result means
16
that Cn is predictable to C*. Conversely, since Cn > C1 by hypothesis, the output partition of C* is
predictable to Cn, and therefore C* is. Finally, since {Ci} is fully distinguishable, C* and Cn are
distinguishable. Therefore Thm. 2 applies, and by using our hypothesis we arrive at a contradic-
tion. QED.
What are the general conditions under which two computers can be predictable to one
another? By Thm. 2, we know they aren’t if they’re input-distinguishable. What about if they’re
one and the same? No physical computer is input-distinguishable from itself, so Thm. 2 doesn’t
apply to this issue. However it still turns out that Thm. 2’s implication holds for this issue:
Theorem 3: No physical computer is predictable to itself.
Proof. Assume our corollary is wrong, and some computer C is predictable to itself. Since by def-
inition predictability implies intelligibility, we can apply Lemma 1 to establish that there is a q ∈
OUTq, q', such that A(q') = B. Therefore one question-independent intelligibility function for C is
the function f from ^u ∈ ^U → B that equals 1 if A(OUTq( ^u )) = B and OUTα( ^u ) = 0, and equals
0 otherwise. Therefore by hypothesis ∃ IN ∈ {IN} such that IN( ^u ) = IN ⇒ A(OUTq( ^u )) = B
and OUTα( ^u ) = f( ^u ). But if A(OUTq( ^u )) = B, then f( ^u ) = NOT[OUTα( ^u )], by definition of
f(.). Since IN is surjective, this means that there is at least one ^u ∈ ^U such that A(OUTq( ^u )) = B
and OUTα( ^u ) = NOT[OUTα( ^u )]. This is impossible. QED.
Intuitively, this result holds due to the fact that a computer cannot make as its prediction the logi-
cal inverse of its prediction. An important corollary of this result is that no output partition is pre-
dictable to a physical computer that has that output partition. Combining Thm. 3 and Coroll. 1 and
identifying the predictability relationship with an edge in a graph, we see that fully distinguish-
able sets of physical computers constitute (unions of) directed acyclic graphs.
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ii) Weak predictability and variants of error correction
When considering sets of more than two computers, it is important to realize that while it is
symmetric, the input-distinguishability relation need not be transitive. Accordingly, separate pair-
wise distinguishable sets of computers may partially “overlap” one another. Similarly, stipulating
the values of the inputs of any two computers in a pairwise-distinguishable set may force some of
the other computers in that set to have a particular input value.
Coroll. 1 does not apply to such a set. As it turns out though, Thm. 2 still has strong implica-
tions even for a set of more than two computers that is not fully distinguishable, so long as the set
is pairwise distinguishable. Define a god computer as any physical computer in a pairwise distin-
guishable set such that all other physical computers in that set are predictable to the god computer.
Then by Thm. 2, each such set can contain at most one god computer. There is at most one com-
puter in any pairwise distinguishable set that can correctly predict the future of all other members
of that set, and more generally at most one that can accurately predict the past of, observe, and/or
control any system in that set (see paper I). In particular, for any human being physical computer,
for any pairwise distinguishable set of computers including that human, there can be at most one
god computer. (Lest one read too much into the phrase “god computer”, note that like any other
computer, a god computer is merely a set of partitions, and need not correspond to any localized
physical apparatus.)
Even a god computer may not be able to correctly predict all other computers in its distin-
guishable set simultaneously. The input value it needs to adopt to correctly predict some C2 may
preclude it from correctly predicting some C3 and vice-versa. One way to analyze this issue is to
consider a composite partition OUT2×3 defined by the output partitions of C2 and C3. We can then
investigate whether and when our god computer can weakly predict the composite output parti-
tion. The following definition formalizes this:
Definition 7: Consider a pairwise distinguishable set {Ci} with god computer C1. Define the par-
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titions OUTi×j ( ^u ∈ ^U ) ≡ (OUTqi×j (
^u ), OUT αi×j ( ^u )), where each answer map OUT αi×j ( ^u ) ≡
(OUT1α( ^u ), OUT2α( ^u )), and each question [OUTqi×j (
^u )] ≡ the mapping given by ^u' ∈ ^U →
([OUT1q( ^u )]( ^u' ), [OUT2q( ^u )]( ^u' )). Then C1 is omniscient if OUT2×3×... is weakly predictable
to C1.
Intuitively, OUTi×j is just the double partition (OUTi(.), OUTj(.)) = ((OUTiq(.), OUTiα(.)),
(OUTjq(.), OUTjα(.)), re-expressed to be in terms of a single question-valued partition and a sin-
gle answer-valued partition. To motivate this re-expression, for any two questions qi ∈ Qi and qj ∈
Qj, let qi × qj be the ordered product of the partitions qi and qj; it is the partition assigning to every
point ^u' ∈ ^U the label (qi( ^u' ), qj( ^u' )). Then if OUTiq( ^u ) is the question qi and OUTjq( ^u ) is
the question qj, OUT i×jq ( ^u ) is the question qi × qj. OUTi×jα is defined similarly, only with one
fewer levels of “indirection”, since answer components of output partitions are not themselves
partitions (unlike question components).
Note that even though any OUTi(.) and OUTj(.) are both surjective mappings, OUTi×j need
not be surjective onto the set of quadruples {qi ∈ Qi, qj ∈ Qj, αi ∈ A(Qi), αj ∈ A(Qj)}. It is
straight-forward to verify that an omniscient computer is a god computer.
In general, one might presume that two non-god computers in a pairwise-distinguishable set
could have the property that, while individually they cannot predict everything, considered jointly
they would constitute a god computer, if only they could work cooperatively. An example of such
cooperativity would be having one of the computers predict when the other one’s prediction is
wrong. It turns out though that under some circumstances the mere presence of some other com-
puter in that pairwise distinguishable set may make such error-correction impossible, if that other
computer is omniscient.
As an example of this, say we have three pair-wise distinguishable computers C1, C2, C3,
where C3 always answers with a bit (i.e., /∃ q3 ∈ Q3 such that A(q3) |⊆ B). We will want C2’s out-
put to “correct” C3’s predictions, and have those predictions potentially concern C1. So have C1
be intelligible to C3. As a technical condition, assume not only that C3’s output can be any of its
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possible question-answer pairs, but also that for any of its questions, for any of the associated pos-
sible answers, there are situations where that answer is correct (so that C2 should leave C3’s
answer alone in those situations). Then it turns out that due to Thm. 2, if C1 is omniscient, it is not
possible that C2 always correctly outputs a bit saying whether C3’s answer is the correct response
to C3’s question. More formally,
Corollary 2: Consider three pair-wise distinguishable computers C1, C2, C3, where /∃ q3 ∈ Q3
such that A(q3) |⊆ B. Assume that C1 is an omniscient computer, and that C1 is intelligible to C3.
Finally, assume that ∀ pairs (q3 ∈ Q3, α3 ∈ A(q3)), ∃ ^u ∈ ^U such that both OUT3q( ^u ) = q3 and
q3( ^u ) = α3 (i.e., [OUT3q( ^u )]( ^u ) = α3). Then it is not possible that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U, OUT2α( ^u ) = 1
if [OUT3q( ^u )]( ^u ) = OUT3α( ^u ), 0 otherwise.
Proof: Hypothesize that the corollary is wrong. Construct a composite device C2-3, starting by
having IN2-3(.) ≡ OUT3q(.), Q2-3 = Q3 and OUT2-3q(.) = OUT3q(.). Next define the question θ by
the rule θ( ^u ) ≡ NOT[OUT3α( ^u )] if OUT2α( ^u ) = 0, θ( ^u ) ≡ OUT3α( ^u ) otherwise. (N.b. no
assumption is made that θ ∈ Q2-3.) To complete the definition of the composite computer C2-3,
have OUT2-3α( ^u ) = θ( ^u ).
Now by our hypothesis, ∀ ^u ∈ ^U, θ( ^u ) = [OUT3q( ^u )]( ^u ). By the last of the conditions
specified in the corollary, this means that ∀ (q2-3 ∈ Q2-3, α2-3 ∈ A(q2-3)), ∃ ^u such that
OUT2-3q( ^u ) = q2-3 and OUT2-3α( ^u ) = α2-3. So C2-3 allows all possible values of {OUT2-3}, as
a physical computer must. Due to surjectivity of OUT3q, it also allows all possible values of the
space {IN2-3}. To complete the proof that C2-3 is a (surjective) physical computer, we must estab-
lish that OUT2-3α( ^u ) ∈ A(OUT2-3q( ^u )) ∀ ^u ∈ ^U. To do this note that if for example
A(OUT2-3q( ^u )) = A(OUT3q( ^u )) = {1}, then since it is always the case that the OUT2-3α( ^u ) =
[OUT2-3q( ^u )]( ^u ) = [OUT3q( ^u )]( ^u ), OUT2-3α( ^u ) = 1. Similarly OUT2-3α( ^u ) ∈
A(OUT2-3q( ^u )) when A(OUT2-3q( ^u )) = {0}. Finally, if A(OUT2-3q( ^u )) = B, then the simple
fact that OUT2-3α( ^u ) ∈ B always means that OUT2-3α( ^u ) ∈ A(OUT2-3q( ^u )).
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Since C1 is intelligible to C3 and Q2-3 = Q3, C1 is intelligible to C2-3. Moreover, given any
question q2-3 ∈ Q2-3, ∃ associated IN2-3 ∈ {IN2-3} such that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U for which IN2-3( ^u ) =
IN2-3, OUT2-3( ^u ) = q2-3. But as was just shown, OUT2-3α( ^u ) = q2-3( ^u ) for that ^u. Therefore
C1 is predictable to C2-3.
Next, since C1 is omniscient, OUT2×3 is intelligible to C1. Therefore any binary function of
the regions defined by quadruples (A(OUT2q( ^u )), A(OUT3q( ^u )), OUT2α( ^u ), OUT3α( ^u )) is
an element of Q1. Any single such region is wholly contained in one region defined by the pair
(A(OUT2-3q( ^u )), OUT2-3α( ^u )) though. Therefore any binary function of the regions defined by
such pairs is an element of Q1. Therefore C2-3 is intelligible to Q1. Similarly, the value of any
such binary function must be given by OUT1α( ^u ) whenever IN1( ^u ) equals some associated IN1.
So C2-3 is predictable to C1.
Finally, since C1 and C3 are input-distinguishable, so are C1 and C2-3, and therefore Thm. 2
applies. This establishes that our hypothesis results in a contradiction. QED.
This result even holds if OUT2×3 is only intelligible to C1, without necessarily being predictable
to it.
Coroll. 2 can be viewed as a restriction on the efficacy of any error correction scheme in the
presence of a (distinguishable) omniscient computer. There are other restrictions that hold even in
the absence of such a third computer. An example is the following implication of Thm. 2:
Corollary 3: Consider two distinguishable mutually intelligible physical computers C1 and C2,
where both A(OUT1q) ⊆ B and A(OUT2q) ⊆ B ∀ OUT1q ∈ Q1 and OUT2q ∈ Q2. It is impossible
that C1 and C2 are “anti-predictable” to each other, in the sense that for each of them, the predic-
tion they make concerning the state of the other can always be made to be wrong by appropriate
choice of input.
Proof: By assumption C1 and C2 are mutually intelligible. So what we must establish is whether
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for both of them, for all intelligibility functions concerning the other one, there exists an appropri-
ate value of INi such that that intelligibility function is incorrectly predicted.
Hypothesize that the corollary is wrong. Then ∀ question-independent intelligibility functions
for C1, f1, ∃ IN2 ∈ {IN2} such that IN2( ^u ) = IN2 implies that [A(OUT2q( ^u )) = NOT[A(f1)]] ^
[OUT2α( ^u ) = NOT[f1( ^u )]]. However by definition of question-independent intelligibility func-
tions, given any such f1, there must be another question-independent intelligibility function for
C1, f3, defined by f3(.) ≡ NOT(f1(.)). Therefore ∃ IN2 ∈ {IN2} such that IN2( ^u ) = IN2 implies
that [A(OUT2q( ^u )) = A(f3)]  ^  [OUT2α( ^u ) = f3( ^u )].
This NOT(.) transformation bijectively maps the set of all question-independent intelligibility
functions for C2 onto itself. Since that set is finite, this means that the image of the set under the
NOT(.) transformation is the set itself. Therefore our hypothesis means that all question-indepen-
dent functions for C1 can be predicted correctly by C2 for appropriate choice of IN2 ∈ {IN2}. By
similar reasoning, we see that C1 can always predict C2 correctly. Since C1 and C2 are distinguish-
able, we can now apply Thm. 2 and arrive at a contradiction. QED.
iii)  Strong predictability
At the other end of the spectrum from distinguishable computers is the case where one com-
puter’s input can fix another’s, either by being observed by that other computer or by setting that
other computer’s input more directly. The following variant of predictability captures this rela-
tionship:
Definition 8: Consider a pair of physical computers C1 and C2. We say that C2 is strongly predict-
able to C1 (or equivalently that C1 can strongly predict C2), and write C1 >> C2 (or equivalently
C2 << C1) iff:
i) C2 is intelligible to C1;
ii) ∀ question-independent intelligibility functions for C2, q1, ∀ IN2 ∈ {IN2},
∃ IN1 ∈ {IN1} that strongly induces the pair (q1, IN2), i.e., such that:
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IN1( ^u ) =  IN1
⇒
    [OUT1p( ^u ) = (A(q1), q1( ^u ))]   ^  [IN2( ^u ) = IN2].
Intuitively, if C1 can strongly predict C2, then for any IN2 and associated implication OUT2p —
for any computation C2 might undertake — there is an input to C1 that is uniquely associated
with IN2 and that causes C1 to output (any desired question-independent intelligibility function
of) OUT2p. Intuitively, there is some invertible “translating” map that takes C2’s input and
“encodes” it in C1’s input, in such a way that C1 can “emulate” C2 running on C2’s input, and
thereby produce C2’s associated output. In this way C1 can emulate C2, much like universal Tur-
ing machines can emulate other Turing machines. (Recall the definition of universal Turing
machine, and see the definition of a universal physical computer below.)
Strong predictability of a computer implies weak predictability of that computer. (Unlike with
weak predictability, there is no such thing as strong predictability of a partition.) So for example
both Thm. 3 and Coroll. 1 still hold if they are changed by replacing weak predictability with
strong predictability. However weak predictability does not imply strong predictability. Moreover,
the mathematics for sets of physical computers some of which are strongly predictable to each
other (and therefore not distinguishable) differs in some respects from that when all the computers
are distinguishable (the usual context for investigations of weak predictability). An example is the
following result, which shows that strong predictability always is transitive, unlike weak predict-
ability (cf. Ex. 2" in paper I):
Theorem 4: Consider three physical computers {C1, C2, C3}, and a partition pi, where both C3
and pi are intelligible to C1.
i)  C1 >> C2 > pi ⇒ C1 > pi;
ii) C1 >> C2 >> C3 ⇒ C1 >> C3.
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Proof: To prove (i), let f be any question-independent intelligibility function for pi. By Lemma 1,
the everywhere 0-valued question-independent intelligibility function of pi is contained in Q1, and
since C1 > C2, there must be an IN1 such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 ⇒ OUT1α( ^u ) = 0. The same is true
for the everywhere 1-valued function. Therefore to prove the claim we need only establish that for
every question-independent intelligibility function for pi, f, for which A(f) = B, f ∈ Q1, and there
exists an IN1 such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 ⇒ OUT1α( ^u ) = f( ^u ). Restrict attention to such f from
now on.
Define a question-independent intelligibility function for C2, I2, such that A(I2) = B, and such
that for all ^u for which A(OUTq( ^u )) = B, I2( ^u ) = OUT2α( ^u ). (Note that since C2 > pi, there
both exist ^u for which OUT2p( ^u ) = (B, 1) and ^u such that OUT2p( ^u ) = (B, 0.) Now by hypoth-
esis, for any of the f we are considering, ∃ IN2f ∈ {IN2} such that IN2( ^u ) = IN2f ⇒ OUT2p( ^u )
= (B, f( ^u )). However the fact that C1 >> C2 ⇒ ∃ IN1 ∈ {IN1} such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 ⇒
IN2( ^u ) = IN2f and such that OUT1p( ^u ) = (A(I2), I2( ^u )) = (B, I2( ^u )). Since IN2( ^u ) = IN2f for
such a ^u, A(OUT2α( ^u )) = B, and therefore I2( ^u ) = OUT2α( ^u ). So OUT2p( ^u ) for such a ^u
equals (B, OUT2α( ^u )). So for that IN1, OUT1p( ^u ) = (A(f), f( ^u )).
This establishes (i). The proof for (ii) goes similarly, with the redefinition that IN1f fixes the
value of IN3 as well as ensuring that OUT2p( ^u ) = (A(f), f( ^u )). QED.
Strong predictability obeys the following result which is analogous to both Thm.’s 2 and 3:
Theorem 5: Consider any pair of physical computers {Ci: i = 1, 2}. It is not possible that both C1
>> C2 and C1 << C2.
Proof: Choose any IN2. For any question-independent intelligibility function of OUT2p, f, there
must exist an IN1f ∈ {IN1} that strongly induces IN2 and f, since C1 >> C2. Label any such IN1 as
IN1f (IN2 being implicitly fixed). So for any such f, { ^u : IN1( ^u ) = IN1f} ⊆ { ^u : IN2( ^u ) = IN2}.
However since OUT2p is not empty, there are at least two question-independent intelligibility
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functions of OUT2p, f1 and f2, where A(f1) ≠ A(f2) (cf. Lemma 1). Moreover, the intersection
{ ^u : IN1( ^u ) = IN1f1} ∩ {
^u : IN1( ^u ) = IN1f2} = ∅, since these two sets induce different
A(OUT1q) (namely A(f1) and A(f2), respectively). This means that { ^u : IN1( ^u ) = IN1f1} ⊂
{ ^u : IN2( ^u ) = IN2}. On the other hand, for the same reasons, there must also exist an IN2 that
strongly induces IN1f1. Therefore ∃ IN
2' such that { ^u : IN2( ^u ) = IN2'} ⊂ { ^u : IN1( ^u ) =
IN1f1}. So {
^u : IN2( ^u ) = IN2'} ⊂ { ^u : IN2( ^u ) = IN2}. This is not compatible with the fact that
IN2(.) is a partition. QED.
Many of the conditions in the preceding results can be weakened and the associated conclu-
sions still hold. Indeed, this is even true for Thm. 2, where we can weaken the definition of “intel-
ligibility” and still establish the impossibility of having both C1 > C2 and C2 > C1. (For example,
that impossibility will still obtain even if neither C1 nor C2 contains B-valued questions, if they
instead contain all possible functions mapping each others’ values of OUTp onto {0, 1, 2}.) These
weakened version are usually more obscure though, which is why they are not presented here.
iv) Physical computation analogues of Halting theorems in Turing machine theory
There are several ways that one can relate the mathematical structure of physical computation
to that of conventional computer science. Here we sketch the salient concepts for one such rela-
tion coupling physical computation and the mathematical structure governing Turing machines
(TMs).
A TM is a device that takes in an input string on an input tape, then based on it produces
a sequence of output strings, either “halting” at some time with a final output string, or never halt-
ing. If desired, the fact that the halt state has / hasn’t been entered by any time can be reflected in
a special associated pattern in the output string, in which case the sequence of output strings can
always be taken to be infinite. As explicated above, in the real world inputs and (sequences of)
outputs are elements of partitions of ^U. So in one translation of TMs to physical computers,
strings on tapes are replaced with elements of the partitions IN(.) and OUT(.). Rather than
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through a set of internal states, read/write operations, state-transition rules, etc., the transforma-
tion of inputs to outputs in a physical computer is achieved simply through the definition of the
pair of an associated input partition and output partition. For a TM that declares in its output
string whether it has halted, the physical computation analogue of whether a computation will
ever halt is simply whether ^u is in some special subset of {OUT}. Although not formally
required, in the real world IN(.) and OUT(.) usually differ. In this they are analogous to TM’s with
multiple tapes rather than conventional single-tape TMs.
An alternative to identifying the full output partition of a physical computer with a TM’s out-
put tape, motivated by the definition of predictability, is to identify the coarser partition ^u →
OUTp( ^u ) with a TM’s output tape. (This is loosely analogous to a TM’s being able to overwrite
the “question” originally posed on its tape when producing its “answer” on that tape.) We will
adopt this identification from now on, and use it to identify the physical computation analogue of
a TM as an input partition together with the surjective mapping ^u → OUTp( ^u ) of an associated
output partition.
This identification motivates several analogues of the Halting theorem. Since whether a partic-
ular physical computer C2 “halts” or not can be translated into whether its output is in a particular
region, the question of whether C2 halts is a particular intelligibility function of C2. Correctly
answering the question of whether C2 halts means predicting that intelligibility function of C2. In
the context of physical computation it is natural to broaden the issue to concern all intelligibility
functions of C2. Accordingly, in this analogue of the claim resolved for TM’s (in the negative) by
the Halting theorem, one asks if it is possible to construct a physical computer C1 that can predict
any computer C2. To answer this, consider the case where C2 is a copy of C1 (cf. Def. 2(v) of
paper I for a formal definition of a physical computer’s “copy”). Then by applying Thm.’s 2, 3 and
5, one sees that the answer is no, in agreement with the Halting theorem. (See also Coroll. 3.)
There exist a number of alternative physical computer analogues of the Halting problem.
Though not pursued at length here, it is worth briefly presenting one such alternative. This alterna-
tive is motivated by arguing that, in the real world, one is not interested so much in whether the
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computation will ever “halt”, but rather whether the associated output is “correct”. If we take
“correct” to be relative to a particular question, this motivates the following alternative analogue
of the Halting theorem:
Theorem 6: Given a set of physical computers {Ci}, /∃ C1 ∈ {Ci} such that ∀ C2 ∈ {Ci},
i) C2 is intelligible to C1;
ii) ∀ q2 ∈ Q2, ∃ IN1 ∈ {IN1} such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 ⇒ OUT1α( ^u ) = 1 iff q2( ^u ) =
  OUT2α( ^u ).
Proof: Choose C2 such that OUT2(.) = OUT1(.). (If need be, to do this simply choose C2 = C1.)
Then in particular, OUT1α(.) = OUT2α(.). Now since C2 is intelligible to C1 by hypothesis, by
Lemma 1 ∃ q1 ∈ Q1 such that A(q1) = {0}, and therefore ∃ q2 ∈ Q2 such that A(q2) = {0}. For
that q2, OUT1α( ^u ) = 1 iff 0 = OUT1α( ^u ), which is impossible. QED.
A TM T1 can emulate a TM T2 if for any input for T2, T1 produces the same output as T2
when given an appropriately modified version of that input. (Typically, the “modification”
involves pre-pending an encoding of T2 to that input.) The analogous concept for a physical com-
puter is strong predictability; o ne physical computer can “emulate” another if it can strongly pre-
dict that other one. Intuitively, the two components of T1’s emulating T2, involving T2’s input and
its computational behavior, respectively, correspond to the two components of the requirement
concerning IN1 values that occur in the definition of strong predictability. The requirement con-
cerning IN1 values that is imposed by ensuring that OUT1p( ^u ) = (A(q), q( ^u )) for any q (that is
an intelligibility function) for C2 is analogous to encoding (the computational behavior of) the
TM T2 in a string provided to the emulating TM, T1. Requiring as well that the value IN1 ensures
that IN2( ^u ) = IN2 is analogous to also including an “appropriately modified” version of T2’s
input in the string provided to T1. (Note that any mapping taking IN2 ∈ {IN2} to an IN1 that in
turn induces that starting IN2 is invertible, by construction.) This motivates the following defini-
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tion of the analogue of a universal TM:
Definition 9: A universal physical computer for a set of physical computers is a member of that
set that can strongly predict all other members of that set.
Note that rather than reproduce the output of a computer it is strongly predicting, a universal
physical computer produces the value of an intelligibility function applied to that output. This
allows the computers in our set to have different output spaces from the universal physical com-
puter. However it contrasts with the situation with conventional TM’s, being a generalization of
such TM’s.
v)  Prediction complexity
In computer science theory, given a universal TM T, the algorithmic complexity of an output
string s is defined as the length of the smallest input string s' that when input to T produces s as
output. To construct our physical computation analogue of this, we need to define the “length” of
an input region of a physical computer. To do this we start with the following pair of definitions:
Definition 10: For any physical computer C with input space {IN}:
i) Given any partition pi, a (weak) prediction input set (of C, for pi) is any set s ⊆ {IN} such
that both every intelligibility function for pi is weakly induced by an element of s, and for any
proper subset of s at least one such function is not weakly induced. We write the space of all weak
prediction input sets of C for pi as C-1(pi).
ii) Given any other physical computer C' with input space {IN'} for which the set of all ques-
tion-independent intelligibility functions is {f'}, a strong prediction input set of C, for the triple
C', in' ⊆ {IN'}, and f ' ⊆ {f'}, is any set s ⊆ {IN} such that both every pair (f' ∈ f ', IN' ∈ in') is
strongly induced by a member of s, and for any proper subset of s at least one such pair is not
strongly induced. We write the space of all strong prediction input sets (of C, for C', in', and f ') as
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C-1(C', in', f ').
Intuitively, the prediction set of C for pi / C' is a minimal subset of {IN} that is needed by C for pi /
C' to be predictable to C. In the case of strong prediction, we provide the associated definition the
extra flexibility of being able to restrict what intelligibility functions are being considered.
Now, to define the physical computation analogue of algorithmic information complexity,
identify the “length of an input string” with the negative logarithm of the volume of a subset of the
partition IN(.):
Definition 11: Given a physical computer C and a measure dµ over ^U:
i) Define V(in ⊆ {IN}) as the measure of the set of all ^u ∈ ^U such that IN( ^u ) ∈ in, and define the
length of in (with respect to IN(.)) as l(in) ≡  -ln[V(in)];
ii) Given a partition pi that is predictable to a physical computer C, define the prediction complex-
ity of pi (with respect to C), c(pi | C), as minρ ∈ C-1(pi) [l(ρ)].
We are primarily interested in prediction complexities of binary partitions, in particular of the
binary partitions induced by the separate single elements of multi-element partitions. (The binary
partition induced by some p ∈ pi' is { ^u s.t. pi'( ^u ) = p, ^u s.t. pi'( ^u ) ≠ p}.) To see what Def. 11(ii)
means for such a partition, say you are given some set σ ⊂ ^U (i.e., you are given a binary partition
of ^U). Suppose further that you wish to know whether the universe is in σ, and you have some
computer C to use to answer (all four intelligibility functions of) this question. Then loosely
speaking, the prediction complexity of σ with respect to C is the minimal amount of Shannon
information that must be imposed in C’s inputs in order to be assured that C’s output correctly
answers that question. In particular, if σ corresponds to a potential future state of some system S
external to C, then c(σ | C) is a measure of how difficult it is for C to predict that future state of
S.1s
In many situations it will be most natural to choose dµ to be uniform over accessible phase
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space volume, so that the complexity of in is the negative physical entropy of constraining ^u to lie
in in. But that need not be the case. For example, we can instead define dµ so that the volume of
each element of the associated {IN} is some arbitrary positive real number. In this case, the
lengths of the elements of {IN} provides us with an arbitrary ordering over those elements.
The following example illustrates the connection between lengths of regions in and lengths of
strings in TM’s:
Example 3: In a conventional computer (see Ex. 1 above), we can define a “partial string” s
(sometimes called a “file”) taking up the beginning of an input section as the set of all “complete
strings” taking up the entire input section whose beginning is s. We can then identify the input to
the computer as such a partial string in its input section. (Typically, there would be a special fixed-
size “length of partial string” region even earlier, at the very beginning of the input section, telling
the computer how much of the complete string to read to get that partial string.) If we append cer-
tain bits to s to get a new longer input partial string, s', the set of complete strings consistent with
s' is a proper subset of the set of complete strings consistent with s. Assuming our measure dµ is
independent of the contents of the “length of partial string” region, this means that l(s') ≥ l(s).
This is in accord with the usual definition of the length of a string used in Turing machine the-
ory. Indeed, if s' contains n more bits than does s, then there are 2n times as many complete strings
consistent with s as there are consistent with s'. Accordingly, if we take logarithms to have base 2,
l(s') = l(s) + n.
Say we want our computer to be able to predict whether ^u lies in some set σ. (To maintain the
analogy with Turing machines, σ could delineate an “output partial string”. This could be done for
example by delineating a particular OUTp value, perhaps even one in some other computer.) In
the usual way, this corresponds to having the binary partition { ^u ∈ σ, ^u ∉ σ} be weakly predict-
able to our computer. So the prediction complexity of that prediction is the length of the shortest
region of our input space that will weakly induce that prediction. (Note that since we require that
all four intelligibility functions of σ be induced, more than one input “partial string” is required
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for that induction, in general.)
The fact that OUTp values specify the set A(OUTq) makes working with Def.’s 10 and 11 a bit
messy. In particular, to relate prediction complexity to properties of the associated universal phys-
ical computer we must use a set of “identity” intelligibility functions defined as follows:
Definition 12 (i): Given a space X ⊆ B and a physical computer C with input and output spaces
{IN} and {OUT} respectively,
{ICX} is the set of all question-independent intelligibility functions of C where A(ICX) = X,
and where ∀ ^u such that A(OUTq( ^u )) = X, ICX( ^u ) = OUTα( ^u ).
We also will need the following definition:
Definition 12 (ii): Given a space X ⊆ B and a physical computer C with input and output spaces
{IN} and {OUT} respectively,
when X is a set C-1(X) is also a set, defined as those IN ∈ {IN} such that IN( u^ ) = IN ⇒
A(OUTq( u^ )) = X.
So for example, if X = B, a pair (IN2 ∈ [C2]-1(X), I2X ∈ {I2X}) is an input to C2 and an intelligi-
bility function of C2’s output, respectively. That input IN2 induces an associated output question,
q2 ∈ OUT2q, that takes on (both) B values as one varies over the ^u input to it. Similarly, the intel-
ligibility function IN2X takes on (both) B values as one varies over the inputs to it.
Using these definitions, we now bound how much more complex a partition can appear to C1
than to C2 if C1 can strongly predict C2. Though somewhat forbidding in appearance, intuitively,
the bound simply reflects the complexity cost of “encoding” C2 in C1’s input.
Theorem 8: Given any partition pi and physical computers C1 and C2 where C1 >> C2 > pi,
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i) c(pi | C1)   - c(pi | C2) ≤
ln[o(2pi)]  -  ln[3]  +
max {X⊆B, IN2∈[C2]-1(X), I2X∈{I2X}} l[ (C
1)-1(C2, IN2, I2X) ]    -
min {X⊆B, IN2∈[C2]-1(X)} l[ IN2 ] ,
or alternatively,
ii) c(pi | C1)   - c(pi | C2) ≤
ln[o(2pi)]    +
min {X⊆B, IN2∈[C2]-1(X),  I2X∈{I2X}} l[ (C
1)-1(C2, IN2, I2X) ]   -
min {X⊆B, IN2∈[C2]-1(X)} l[ IN2 ]  .
Proof: Given any intelligibility function f for pi, consider any IN2f ∈ {IN2} that weakly induces f,
i.e., such that IN2( ^u ) = IN2f ⇒ OUT2p( ^u ) = (A(f), f( ^u )). (The analysis will not be affected if pi
is an output partition and we restrict attention to those intelligibility functions for pi that are ques-
tion-independent.) Since C1 >> C2, we can then choose an IN1, IN1f(IN2f), to strongly induce IN2f
together with any question-independent intelligibility function of OUT2p. (Indeed, in general
there can be more than one such value of IN1 that induces IN2f.) So in particular, we can choose it
so that the vector OUT1p( ^u ) = (A(I2A(f)), I2A(f)( ^u )) for any possible function I2A(f). Now for
that IN1, IN2( ^u ) = IN2f, and therefore A(OUT2q( ^u )) = A(f), which means that I2A(f)( ^u ) =
OUT2α( ^u ), which in turn equals f( ^u ) for that IN2. So ∀ ^u such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1f(IN2f),
OUT1p( ^u ) = (A(f), f( ^u )). In other words, IN1f(IN2f) weakly induces in C1 the same intelligibil-
ity function for pi that IN2f weakly induces in C2. However since IN1( ^u ) = IN1f(IN2f) ⇒
IN2f( ^u ) = IN2f, the set of ^u ∈ ^U such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1f(IN2f) is ⊆ the set such that IN2( ^u ) =
IN2f. This means that l(IN1f(IN2f)) ≥ l(IN2f). (Our task, loosely speaking, is to bound this differ-
ence in lengths, and then to extend the analysis to simultaneously consider all such question-inde-
pendent intelligibility functions f.)
Take {fi} to be the set of all intelligibility functions for pi. By the preceding construction, pi is
weakly predictable to C1 with a (not necessarily proper) subset of {IN1fi(IN2fi)} being a member
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of (C1)-1(pi). Now any member of (C1)-1(pi) must contain at least three disjoint elements, corre-
sponding to intelligibility functions q with A(OUT1q( ^u )) = B, {0}, or {1}. (See the discussion
just before Lemma 1.) Accordingly, the volume (as measured by dµ) of any subset of
{IN1fi(IN2fi)} ∈ (C
1)-1(pi) must be at least 3 times the volume of the element of {IN1fi(IN2fi)} hav-
ing the smallest volume. In other words, the length of any subset of {IN1fi(IN2fi)} ∈ (C
1)-1(pi)
must be at most -ln(3) plus the length of the longest element of {IN1fi(IN2fi)}. Therefore c(pi | C1)
≤ maxfi [l(IN1fi(IN2fi))] - ln(3).
Now take {IN2fi} to be the set in (C2)
-1(pi) with minimal length. {IN2fi} has at most o(2
pi) dis-
joint elements, one for each intelligibility function for pi. Using the relation mini[gi] = -maxi [-gi],
this means that c(pi | C2) ≥ -ln[o(2pi)] + minfi [l(IN2fi)]. Therefore we can write c(pi | C1) - c(pi | C2)




q( ^u )) = A(fi) ⊆ B completes the proof of (i).
To prove (ii), note that we can always construct one of the sets in (C1)-1(pi) by starting with the
set consisting of the element of {IN1fi(IN2fi)} having the shortest length, and then successively
adding other IN1 values to that set, until we get a full (weak) prediction set. Therefore c(pi | C1) ≤
minfi l(IN1fi(IN2fi)). Using this bound rather than the one involving -ln(3) establishes (ii). QED.
Note that the set of X ∈ B such that [C2]-1(X) exists must be non-empty, since C2 > pi. Simi-
larly, C2 > pi means that there is a ^u such that A(OUTq( ^u )) = X ⊆ B. The associated I2X always
exists by construction: simply define I2X( ^u ) = OUT2α( ^u ) ∀ ^u such that A(OUTq( ^u )) = X, and
for all other ^u, I2X( ^u ) = x for some x ∈ X. Therefore the extrema in our bounds are always well-
defined.
As one varies pi, in both bounds in Thm. 8 the dependence of the bound on C1 and C2 does not
change. In addition, those bounds are independent of pi for all pi sharing the same cardinality. So in
particular they are independent of pi for all binary partitions like those discussed in Ex. 3. This
illustrates how Thm. 7 is the physical computation analogue of the result in Turing machine the-
ory that the difference in algorithmic complexity of a fixed string with respect to two separate Tur-
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ing machines is bounded by the complexity of “emulating” the one Turing machine on the other,
independent of the fixed string in question.
Consider the possibility that for the laws of physics in our universe, there exist partitions IN(.)
and OUT(.) that constitute a universal physical computer C* for all other physical computers in
our universe. Then by Thm. 5, no other computer is similarly universal. Therefore there exists a
unique prediction complexity measure that is applicable to all physical computers in our universe,
namely complexity with respect to C*. (This contrasts with the case of algorithmic information
complexity, where there is an arbitrariness in the choice of the universal TM used.) If instead there
is no universal physical computer in our universe, then every physical computer C must fail at
least once at (strongly) predicting some other physical computer. (Note that unlike the case with
weak predictability considered in Thm. 2, here we aren’t requiring that the universe be capable of
having two distinguishable versions of C.) This establishes the following:
Theorem 9: Either infallible strong prediction is impossible in our universe, or there is a unique
complexity measure in our universe.
Similar conclusions hold if one restricts attention to a set of (physically localized) conventional
physical computers (cf. Ex. 1 above), where the light cones in the set are arranged to allow the
requisite information to reach the putative universal physical computer.
FUTURE WORK AND DISCUSSION
Any results concerning physical computation should, at a minimum, apply to the computer
lying on a scientist’s desk. However that computer is governed by the mathematics of determinis-
tic finite automata, not that of Turing machines. In particular, the impossibility results concerning
Turing machines rely on infinite structures that do not exist in any computer on a scientist’s desk.
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Accordingly, there is a discrepancy between the domain of those results and that of any truly gen-
eral theory of physical computers.
On the other hand, when one carefully analyzes actual computers that perform calculations
concerning the physical world, one uncovers a mathematical structure governing those computers
that is replete with its own impossibility results. While much of that structure parallels Turing
machine theory, much of it has no direct analogue in that theory. For example, this new structure
has no need for tapes, moveable heads, internal states, read/write capabilities, and the like, none
of which have any obvious connection to the laws governing our universe (i.e., any connection to
quantum mechanics and general relativity).
In fact, when the underlying functions of real-world computers are stripped down to their
essentials, one does not even need to identify a “computer” with a device occupying a particular
localized region of space-time, never mind one with heads and the like. In place of all those con-
cepts one has a structure involving several partitions over the space of all worldlines of the uni-
verse. The partitions in that structure delineate a particular computer’s inputs, the questions it
addresses, and its outputs. The impossibility results of physical computation concern the relation
of those partitions. Computers in the conventional, space-time localized sense (the box on your
desk) are simply special examples, with lots of extra restrictions that turn out to be unnecessary in
the underlying mathematics. Accordingly, the general definition of a “physical computer” has no
such restrictions. A side-benefit of this breadth is that the associated mathematics can be viewed
as concerning many information-processing activities (e.g., observation, control) normally viewed
as distinct from computation.
In the first paper in this pair, this definition of a physical computer was motivated and pre-
sented, along with some associated theorems. Those theorems imply, amongst other things, that
fool-proof prediction of the future is impossible — there are always some questions concerning
the future that cannot even be posed to a computer, and of those that can be posed, there are
always some for which the computer’s answer will be wrong. By exploiting the breadth of the def-
inition of physical “computation”, similar results hold for the information-processing of observa-
tion and of control. All of this is true even in a classical, non-chaotic, finite universe, and
regardless of the where in the Chomsky hierarchy the computer lies.
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This second paper launches from the theorems of the first paper into a broader, albeit prelimi-
nary investigation of the mathematics of physical computation. It is shown that the computability
structure relating distinct physical computers is that of a directed, acyclic graph. In addition, there
is at most one computer (called a “god computer”) that can predict /observe /control all other
computers. Other results derived include limits on error-correction using multiple computers, and
some analogues of the Halting theorem.
Next a definition of the complexity of a particular computational task for a particular physical
computer, prediction complexity, is motivated. The motivation of this new definition of complex-
ity proceeds by analogy to the concept of the algorithmic information complexity of a symbol
sequence for a universal Turing machine. However whereas algorithmic information complexity
concerns a Turing machine’s generating such a symbol sequence, prediction complexity involves
a physical computer’s addressing a computational task concerning the physical universe.
The difference in prediction complexity of a particular task pi for two different physical com-
puters C1 and C2 is considered. It is proven that that complexity difference is bounded by a func-
tion that only depends on C1 and C2, and is independent of pi. This bound relating the difference in
complexity for two physical computers is analogous to the algorithmic information complexity
cost of emulating one universal Turing machine with another one. Finally, it is proven that either a
certain kind of computation is not possible in our universe, or there is a preferred computer in our
universe. If it exists, that computer could be used to uniquely specify the prediction complexity of
any task pi. Accordingly, either a certain kind of computation is impossible, or there is a preferred
definition of physical complexity (in contrast to the arbitrariness inherent in algorithmic informa-
tion complexity’s choice of universal Turing machine).
The following ideas are just a few of the questions that the analysis of this paper raises:
i) What other restrictions are there on the predictability relations within distinguishable sets of
physical computers beyond that they form unions of DAG’s? In other words, which unions of
DAG’s can be manifested as the predictability relations within a distinguishable set? How does
this answer change depending on whether we are considering sets of fully input-distinguishable
computers or sets of pairwise-distinguishable computers? For what computers are there finite /
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countably infinite / uncountably infinite numbers of levels below it in the DAG to which it
belongs? Might such levels be gainfully compared to the conventional computer science theory
issue of position in the Chomsky hierarchy?
ii) One might try to characterize the unpredictability-of-the-future result of paper I as the physical
computation analogue of the following issue in Turing machine theory. Can one construct a Tur-
ing machine M that can take as input A, an encoding of a Turing machine and its tape, and for any
such A compute what state A’s Turing machine will be in after will be in after n steps, and per-
form this computation in fewer than n steps? This characterization suggests investigating the for-
mal parallels (if any) between the results of these papers and the “speed-up” theorems of
computer science.
iii) More speculatively, the close formal connection between the results of this second paper and
those of computer science theory suggest that it may be possible to find physical analogues of
most of the other results of computer science theory, and thereby construct a full-blown “physical
computer science theory”. In particular, it may be possible to build a hierarchy of physical com-
puting power, in analogy to the Chomsky hierarchy. In this way we could translate computer sci-
ence theory into physics, and thereby render it physically meaningful.
We might be able to do at least some of this even without relying on the DAG relationship
among the physical computers in a particular set. As an example, we could consider a system that
can correctly predict the future state of the universe from any current state of the universe, before
that future state occurs. The behavior of such a system is perfectly well-defined, since the laws of
physics are fully deterministic (for quantum mechanics this statement implicitly presumes that
one views those laws as regarding the evolution of the wave function rather than of observables
determined by non-unitary transformations of that wave function). Nonetheless, by the central
unpredictability result of paper I, we know that such a system lies too high in the hierarchy to
exist in more than one copy in our physical universe.
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With such a system identified with an oracle of computer science theory we have the defini-
tion of a “physical” oracle. Can we construct further analogues with computer science theory by
leveraging that definition of a physical oracle? In other words, can we take the relationships
between (computer science) oracles, Turing machines, and the other members of the (computer
science) Chomsky hierarchy, and use those relationships together with our (physical) oracle and
physical computers to gainfully define other members of a (physical) Chomsky hierarchy?
iv) Can we then go further and define physical analogues of concepts like P vs. NP, and the like?
Might the halting probability constant Ω of algorithmic information theory have an analogue in
physical computation theory?
As another example of possible links between conventional computer science theory and that
of physical computers, is there a physical computer analogue of Berry’s paradox? Weakly predict-
ing a partition is the physical computation analogue of “generating a symbol sequence” in algo-
rithmic information complexity. The core of Berry’s paradox is that there are numbers k such that
no Turing machine can generate a sequence having algorithmic information complexity k (with
respect to some pre-specified universal Turing machine U). So for example one closely related
issue in physical computation is to characterize the physical computers C1 and x ∈ ℜ such that ∃
a computer C2 where C1 >> C2 and where ∀ partitions pi, C2 weakly predicts whether c(pi | C1) >
x (i.e., such that ∃ IN2 ∈ {IN2} such that IN2( ^u ) = IN2 ⇒ OUT2p( ^u ) = (B, whether c(pi | C1) >
x)).
v) Concerns of computer science theory, and in particular of the theory of Turing machines, have
recently been incorporated into a good deal of work on the foundations of physics [33}. Future
work involves replacing physical computers for Turing machines in this work, along with replac-
ing notions like prediction complexity for notions like algorithmic complexity.
vi) Other future work involves investigating other possible definitions of complexity for physical
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computation. Even sticking to analogues of algorithmic information complexity, these might
extend significantly beyond the modifications to the definition of prediction complexity discussed
in the text. For example, one might try to define the analogue of a bit sequence’s “length” in terms
of the number of elements in Q. One might also take the (inverse) complexity of a computational
device to be the number of input-distinguishable computers that can predict that device (working
in some pre-specified input-distinguishable set, presumably).
vii) Yet other future work includes calculating physical complexity of various systems for some of
the simple physical models of real-world computers (e.g., “billiard ball” computers, DNA com-
puting, etc.) that have been investigated, and investigating the prediction complexity of systems
like crystals and gases.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Especially for non-binary pi, many other definitions of prediction complexity besides Def.
11(ii) can be motivated. For example, one could reasonably define the complexity of pi to be the
sum of the complexities of each binary partition induced by an element of pi, i.e., one could define
it as Σp∈pi c({ ^u ∈ p, ^u ∉ p} | C). Another variant, one that would differ from the one considered
in the text even for binary partitions, is minρ∈C-1(pi) [ΣIN∈ρ l(IN)]. For reasons of space, no such
alternatives will be considered in this paper.
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